C.M. Melenovsky
Suffolk University
Philosophy Department
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Program
C.M. Melenovsky
Suffolk University
Philosophy Department
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Program
Books
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
This handbook advances the interdisciplinary field of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) by identifying thirty-five topics of ongoing research. Instead of focusing on historically significant texts, it features experts talking about current debates. Individually, each chapter provides a resource for new research. Together, the chapters provide a thorough introduction to contemporary work in PPE, which makes it an ideal reader for a senior-year course.
The handbook is organized into seven parts, each with its own introduction and five chapters. The "Frameworks" part discusses common tools and perspectives in PPE, and the "Decision-making" section shows different approaches to the study of choice. From there, parts on "Social Structures," "Markets" and "Economic Systems" each use tools from the three PPE disciplines to study and distinguish parts of society. The next part explains dominant theories and challenges to the paradigm of "Distributive Justice." Finally, a part on "Democracy" offers five challenges to current democratic practice.
Work in Progress
Books
Kantian Conventionalism
- The book constructs on argument in favor of conventional rights and obligations on the basis of Kantian moral ideals. In this way, it justifies contingency in morality from a non-contingent foundation. I provide an analysis of social practices and institutions, then argue for Kantian principles that combine with practices and institutions to establish moral claims, obligations, responsibilities, and virtues. In this way, the book develops themes from the work of HLA Hart, John Rawls, and Barbara Herman.
Articles
[Paper on Public Reason in Rawls]
- In this draft paper, I argue that Rawls actually offers two different models of public reason. One model is appropriate in the well-ordered society, and another is appropriate outside of this ideal. Recognizing these two models helps to overcome frequent misinterpretation of Rawls's later work.
[Paper that identifies when legal changes can wrong a person]
- In the course of policy reform, a person’s legal rights might change. For example, a new zoning law might only permit single-family homes where apartments were previously allowed. Or, a new social security law might change when someone can claim full benefits from age 67 to age 69. In this draft paper, I answer the question, “is the person who loses his or her legal rights wronged by the government in cases like these?” Does the law violate valid moral claims when it takes away what people previously had the legal right to do?
[Paper that argues for Conventionalism about Legal Obligations and Legal Rights]
- Leveraging a larger account of moral conventionalism, this paper argues for a multilayered account of the normativity involved in legal practices. A legal system is a social practices that can articulate and change rules of social practices. When the legal system is morally legitimate, we can have reason to follow the rules of that practice that require us to follow the law. When a legal system is generally followed, then the legal system can change the rules of existing practices. When those practices are morally legitimate, we can have reason to follow the new rules (even when the legal system is not itself morally legitimate).
[Paper that defends Hart's theory of social rules]
- In this paper, I defend a version of “practice-positivism" Arthur Applbaum uses this phrase in his book, Ethics for Adversaries, to explain the idea that we can understand the requirements of a social practice without any moral commitments. In this paper, I develop this view and defend it against common criticisms
"International Right and Kant's World Federation" (available by request)
- Completed article arguing that Kant's ideal for international justice is a non-coercive world legislature. I argue that Kant's explicit remarks favor this view, but this seems to conflicts with a common reading of Kant's domestic political philosophy emphasizing the link between government and coercive force. I stoped trying to publish the piece because it seemed impossible to address that larger issue in the space of a single article (because I believe the common reading of Kant is mistaken).
"Legal Obligation and The Value of Choice" (available by request)
- Completed article that defends the Principle of Fair Play (PFP) as the basis for legal obligation. I argue against the view that the PFP only applies when one accepts the benefits of a practice and instead focus on the condition that the practice must be "sufficiently just." Given the value of individual choice, practices that people do not have the option of participating in are not sufficiently just. However, a legal system can be sufficiently just even when people do not have the choice to participate, so the revised PFP can ground legal obligation. I stopped trying to publish the piece because my interests turned elsewhere.
This page briefly describe the work that is not yet published. I do not list the titles of papers that are under review in order to avoid being identified in a google search.